The Southern District of Illinois offers a database of opinions. These opinions were entered between the period of 2/1987 and the present. To conduct a detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box to the right.
Opinions can also be viewed via the U.S. GPO's Federal Digital System
|Date Filed||Summary||Case Number|
In re: Yolanda Ross
Summary: Chapter 7 debtor filed an application to waive the filing fee. Trustee objected and argued that when comparing debtor's income to the official poverty guidelines, the Court must consider the debtor's gross income. The Court held that based on the procedures established by the Judicial Conference of the United States, it is the debtor's net income, not gross, that must be considered. The trustee's objection was overruled and the application was granted.
In re: Ronald Earl and Lisa Marie Stephens v Regions Bank
Summary: Chapter 13 debtors sought to avoid the second mortgage on their home on the basis that the first mortgage exceeded the property’s value. Regions Bank, the second mortgage holder, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the first mortgage encumbered only the interest of Ronald Stephens and not that of the joint debtor, Lisa Stephens. The Court held that the mortgage encumbered Lisa’s one-half interest in the property, leaving no equity to support the Bank’s second mortgage. The motion for summary judgment was denied and judgment was entered in favor of the debtors.
In re: Banterra Bank v Gary and Trudy Crocker
Summary: The bankruptcy court issued various rulings relating to confirmation of a chapter 13 plan and a creditor’s failure to object, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) denied creditor’s objection to the first amended plan, (2) approved the second amended plan, and (3) denied creditor’s motion to convert or dismiss. Creditor appealed, raising seven issues. District court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order of confirmation in its entirety.
In re: Peoples Nationals Bank NA v Cort and Lisa Jones, et al
Summary: This is a district court decision reversing and remanding, and holding that Illinois law requires a mortgage to describe the nature of the debt secured, amount secured, due date and interest rate.
In re: Jerome and Barbara Toppmeyer
Summary: Creditors originally received a judgment against the debtors’ son. This judgment was recorded and a lien was placed against the son’s undivided, one-third interest in a piece of property he shared with his parents. The son sought relief pursuant to Chapter 7 and received a discharge discharging his personal liability on the judgment. The in rem lien survived and remained attached to the property when, subsequent to his discharge, the son transferred his interest back to his parents, the instant debtors. When the debtors filed Chapter 13, Creditors sought to enforce their in rem lien rights and argued that the plan should provide for any unsecured deficiency left after the sale of the property. The Court found that the value of the claim was limited to one-third of the value of the debtors’ property minus the outstanding mortgage claim. The Court further found that while the secured portion must be addressed in the debtors’ plan, any unsecured deficiency need not be addressed as it was not owed by the debtors.
In re: Mike and Michele Vallino v Jeffrey and Angela Weeks
Summary: Damages awarded pursuant to a state court trespass action were dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) where plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants intended the resulting injury. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1988), recklessly or negligently inflicted injuries do not fall within the scope of § 523(a)(6). Even the commission of an intentional tort by the defendant is insufficient to declare a debt non-dischargeable absent a showing that the resulting injury was intended.
In re: Javier Muniz v Shahriar S Bozorgzadeh, et al
Summary: The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on his complaint pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) (actual fraud) and (a)(6) (willful and malicious injury). The plaintiff asserted that after a jury trial in the Illinois trial court, an appellate decision in his favor from the Illinois Court of Appeals, and a denial of certiorari by the Illinois Supreme Court, there were no genuine issues of material fact and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment for plaintiff under the doctrines of full faith and credit, collateral estoppel and law of the case. It held that the state court judgment was non-dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A) and (a)(6).
In re: George Papdopoulos, et al v Paramjitinder S and Surinderjit K Dhillon
Summary: Plaintiffs filed a complaint objecting to the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(6) (wrongful removal of equipment and damage to property) and objecting to discharge under §727(a)(3). Trial was held. Court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof. Judgment entered in favor of the debtors/defendants and against the plaintiffs.
In re: Kimberly Clemons
Summary: Creditor holding undisputed mechanic's lien objected to debtor's claim of homestead exemption. Schedules showed value of both mortgage and mechanic's lien, independently, exceeded value of home. Objection sustained, as homestead exemption allows exemption only for debtor's "interest" in homestead property, and without equity, debtor held no interest under exemption statute.
In re: David B and Sheila V Fredman
Summary: The United States Trustee challenged whether above-median chapter 7 debtors may deduct mortgage payments on real estate that they intend to surrender in performing the means test calculation called for by 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii). The Court found that a presumption of abuse arose in that debtors could not deduct, as “amounts scheduled as contractually due to secured creditors,” mortgage payments owing on a home that they proposed to surrender, on which they were not making any payments (as revealed by expenses listed on the bankruptcy schedules) and as to which they had not opposed a motion for stay relief filed by the mortgage holder.