Opinions

The Southern District of Illinois offers a database of opinions. These opinions were entered between the period of 2/1987 and the present. To conduct a detailed search, enter a keyword or case number in the search box to the right.

 

Opinions can also be viewed via the U.S. GPO's Federal Digital System

Date Filedsort ascending Summary Case Number PDF
04/07/2016

In re: STC Inc

Summary: STC, Inc., a locally owned business in McLeansboro, Illinois, filed a chapter 11 case after entry of a judgment against it for patent infringement. Global Traffic Technologies, LLC, the holder of the judgment and debtor’s largest unsecured creditor, objected to confirmation on the following grounds: (1) debtor gerrymandered the classes to create a potentially accepting impaired class; (2) the plan artificially impairs a class; (3) the plan was not proposed in good faith because of the alleged artificial impairment; (4) the plan is not feasible; and (5) the plan is not fair and equitable under §1129(b)(2). In an opinion entered after trial on the objections to confirmation, the Court overruled the objections.

14-41014 View
09/22/2015

In re: Edwards

Summary: Before Harris v. Viegelahn, 575 U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1829, 191 L.Ed.2d 783 (2015), both Chapter 13 trustees in this district distributed post-petition payments received prior to a case's conversion or dismissal in accordance with the terms of the confirmed Chapter 13 plan. Harris directly precludes trustees from continuing this policy in the event of a case's conversion. The question presented in this case is, in light of Harris, whether post-petition property and wages in the trustee's possession at the time of the dismissal of a Chapter 13 case must be distributed in accordance with the confirmed plan or returned to the debtor. The Court held that, irrespective of Harris, such property and wages must be returned to the debtor because, under § 349(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor has a vested right in such post-petition property and wages.

13-30230 View
09/17/2015

In re: Alvion Properties Inc

Summary: In this chapter 11 case, the debtor owned two pieces of property:  1,294 acres of land owned fee simple, as well as the mineral rights to that land; and an additional 3,219 acres of mineral rights. The secured creditor with the mortgage on the property moved for a determination that the debtor was a single asset real estate under 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).   In response, the debtor argued that it was not a single asset real estate because the property in question did not constitute a single property or project.  The Court ruled in favor of the debtor, finding that the creditor had failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of a single property or project.

15-40462 View
07/07/2015

In re: Forby

Summary: The creditor filed its proof of claim one day before the claims bar date. The claim was rendered deficient by the Clerk's office because it did not substantially conform to Official Form 10 but, rather, was a one-page statement of account. The creditor received notice of the claim's deficiency five days after the claims bar date. Upon receiving notice, the creditor filed an amended claim that utilized Official Form 10. The Trustee objected to the amended claim, stating that under the Seventh Circuit's decision in In re Greenig, 152 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 1998), the claim was barred as untimely, and that the Court was without authority to hold that the timely filed deficient claim was an "informal proof of claim" pursuant to the informal proof of claim doctrine, and thus that the late filed formal claim was an adequate amendment to the deficient claim.

The Court held that the deficient claim was an informal claim and, therefore, that the late filed formal claim was a valid amendment thereto. The Court reasoned that the Seventh Circuit's Greenig decision affected a narrowing of the informal proof of claim doctrine, but that the creditor had complied with the doctrine's now limited contours. Accordingly, the Court overruled the Trustee's objection.
 
14-41229 View
07/02/2015

In re: Lockett

Summary: This matter was before the Court on the debtor's motion to extend the automatic stay and objections thereto by two of the debtor's creditors. The debtor initially filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on December 31, 2012. The debtor and his home mortgage lender preliminarily agreed to a loan modification. During the agreement’s trial period, the debtor fell behind on his payments and, because of this fact, the lender did not approve the modification. The lender filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay on May 14, 2013, after which time the debtor filed an amended Chapter 13 plan that provided for the surrender of his home to the lender. The Court granted the lender's motion on May 29, 2013. Less than five months after receiving relief from the stay, the lender and the debtor entered into a second loan modification agreement. The debtor remained current with his mortgage payments for roughly eight months. However, he fell behind when his spouse became unemployed. 

The lender filed a foreclosure action on February 27, 2015. On March 18, 2015, the debtor filed a voluntary motion to dismiss his case. The Court granted the debtor’s motion on April 3, 2015—674 days after the Court granted the lender's motion for relief from the stay. On April 30, 2015—27 days after obtaining the voluntary dismissal of his prior case—the debtor filed the instant case and moved for an extension of the automatic stay.  Both objecting creditors argued that the debtor was ineligible to be a debtor in the subsequent case pursuant to the plain meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 109(g)(2) and that, therefore, there was no stay in place to extend. The debtor contended that he was not precluded by § 109(g)(2) from being a debtor in the subsequent case and, further, that the stay should be extended pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B) because the subsequent case had been filed in good faith.
 
The Court granted the debtor's motion, holding that the debtor was eligible to be a debtor in the subsequent case because he did not dismiss his prior case in response to the motion for relief from stay.  Instead, that case had been dismissed due to family financial hardship. In addition, the Court extended the stay because neither creditor provided evidence indicating bad faith or in any way challenged the debtor's assertion that the case had been filed in good faith.
 
15-30700 View
02/12/2015

In re: Hunt

Summary: CNB Bank filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay as to all of its collateral, to which Debtor failed to object or in any way respond. The Court granted the bank’s motion. Nineteen days after the Court granted the bank’s motion for relief, Debtor moved to vacate the order. The Court denied Debtor’s motion to vacate, holding that Debtor failed to establish the requirements for relief under Bankruptcy Rules 9023 or 9024 for vacating a final order or judgment.

14-30603 View
01/30/2015

In re: Smith

Summary:  Debtor was sued in Indiana state court for abuse of process.  The state court entered judgment in the amount of $135,374.40 against the debtor and in favor of the plaintiff. After the debtor filed his chapter 7 petition, the plaintiff filed a complaint in this court seeking a determination that the debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as a willful and malicious injury.  The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, holding that under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, it was bound by the state court’s findings that the debtor acted with malice and willful and wanton misconduct. 

14-4002 View
01/22/2015

In re: Chartrand

Summary: Chapter 13 plaintiff/debtor Charles R. Chartrand filed a complaint for injunctive relief against defendant Bank of America, N.A. asking the Court, primarily, to enjoin the defendant from taking any further action during the bankruptcy case to foreclose on its mortgage on the debtor’s residence.  Plaintiff relied on 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) as the source of the Court’s authority to grant such relief.  The Court had entered an order in the debtor’s bankruptcy case determining that there was no automatic stay in effect pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(3) and (j).  The debtor had not appealed that order.  The Court held that under the pronouncements of Law v. Siegel, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194-95 (2014), § 105(a) does not allow the Court to disregard provisions under § 362 that control the existence or absence of the automatic stay.  Therefore, the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and was dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

14-3096 View
12/29/2014

In re: Early

Summary: The Trustee objected to confirmation of the debtor’s Chapter 13 Plan. The above-median debtor’s actual expenses exceeded her allowed deductions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1325(b)(3) and 707(b)(2)(A) and (B), as detailed on Official Form B22C. Her Schedules I and J listed a monthly net income of $158.22; however, her monthly disposable income, as indicated on line 59 of Form B22C, was $815.53. The debtor proposed to make monthly payments of $158 to unsecured creditors during the length of her 60-month plan. The Trustee objected to the debtor’s proposed monthly payments, arguing that by proposing to pay less than her disposable income into the plan for the benefit of her unsecured creditors the debtor’s plan was in violation of § 1325(b). He contended that the debtor was required to propose monthly payments of $815.53, amounting to a total pool for unsecured creditors of $48,931.80. In response, the debtor argued that, under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 177 L.Ed.2d 23 (2010), debtors may deviate from Form B22C in calculating projected disposable income if their actual expenses are greater than their allowed deductions. The Court sustained the Trustee’s objection, holding that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lanning requires adherence to the means test except in unusual cases when, due to significant changes in a debtor’s financial circumstances that are known or virtually certain, the means test does not represent the debtor’s post-confirmation income or expenses. A mere discrepancy between the debtor’s actual expenses and her allowed statutory deductions does not warrant deviation from the means test.

14-30785 View
10/23/2014

In re: Meyer v. Walters et al

Summary: Debtors/defendants entered into an Agreement for Sale of Real Estate with plaintiff.  The Agreement obligated the defendants to purchase certain real estate from the plaintiff.  The property was later damaged in a hail storm.  The defendants received a check from their insurer and represented to the plaintiff that (1) the insurance proceeds would be used to purchase building materials to repair the hail damage and (2) defendant Thomas Walters, a skilled carpenter, would make the necessary repairs. Based on these representations, the plaintiff authorized the defendants to endorse the check on the plaintiff’s behalf and to deposit the insurance proceeds into their bank account.  In the defendants’ bankruptcy case, the plaintiff filed a complaint objecting to the dischargeability of a debt under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A). Trial was held. The Court found in favor of the plaintiff and entered judgment in the amount of $19,516.22, representing homeowner's insurance proceeds misappropriated by the debtors.

14-3035 View

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